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NOTES

NAVIGABLE WATER NOT ALWAYS
SUBJECT TO FREE PUBLIC ACCESS

WATER LAW-Congress has the right to exercise its commerce clause
authority to promote navigation. However, a body of water falling
within the definition of "navigable waters" does not automatically
lead to free public access. Federal navigational servitude does not
constitute a blanket exception to the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. KaiserAetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).

FACTS
Kuapa Pond was a shallow lagoon on the island of Oahu. Since prehistoric times it had been separated from Maunalua Bay and the
Pacific Ocean by a natural barrier beach. Although subject to ebb
and flow, the pond was not in fact navigable. However, in 1961 the
pond was leased to a developer, Kaiser Aetna. Dredging and filling
operations were begun, and eventually a 200-foot wide channel was
dug which connected the pond to Maunalua Bay. At present, Kuapa
Pond is the center of a 6,000 acre private marina called Hawaii Kai,
comprised of 22,000 residents and 668 boats.'
Petitioner lessee, Kaiser Aetna, was advised by the Corps of Engineers that development and operations permits for the pond were
not necessary, and subsequently made improvements which allowed
boats access to and from Maunalua Bay. Thereafter, the United States
filed suit in Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii to determine whether petitioners were required to obtain Corps authorization for future improvements in accordance with § 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act.2 The government also questioned whether petitioners could restrict access to what had become navigable water of
the United States and should be open to the public under the doctrine of navigational servitude.
The federal district court, examining the scope of congressional
regulatory authority under the commerce clause,3 held that the pond
was indeed navigable water of the United States, and therefore subject to regulation by the Corps. Although navigable, the pond was
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1979, at D-4, col 4.

2. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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not within the scope of the doctrine of federal navigational servitude
and the government had no authority to open the pond to the public
without first compensating its owners.4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the pond fell within
the scope of congressional authority. It reversed the federal district
court, however, holding that once the pond was connected to the bay,
it became navigable and therefore subject to navigational servitude.
Consequently the public had a free right of access to the once private
pond.'
HOLDING
By a 6-3 vote, the United States Supreme Court reversed the ninth
circuit decision and held that although the dredged pond fell within
its definition of navigable waters, the concept of federal navigational
servitude did not itself create a blanket exception to the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment.6 The Court agreed that Congress had
extensive authority under the commerce clause and could prescribe
rules governing petitioner's marina in furtherance of trade and commerce. However, it concluded that whether such a statute or regulation amounted to a taking was a separate issue. In this case, the Court
held the government could not create a public right of access to the
improved pond without first invoking its power of eminent domain
and paying just compensation to the owner.
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution states
"Congress shall have Power to ...

regulate commerce. . ..

"'

This

article has been broadly interpreted, and throughout United States
history the Supreme Court has held that a wide spectrum of economic
activities affect interstate commerce and are therefore susceptible to
congressional regulation.' As early as 1824, the Court held that the
power to regulate interstate commerce necessarily included control
of navigable waters. 9 The pervasive nature of congressional authority
over national waters was more recently expressed as follows: "The
point is that navigable waters are subject to national planning and
4. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42 (D. Hawaii, 1976).
5. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V, "[n] or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-190 (1824).
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control in 1the broad regulation of commerce granted the federal government." 0
Navigational servitude, which exists by virtue of the commerce
clause, expresses the notion that the right of the public to use a
waterway supercedes any claim of private ownership.1 I Thus, the
government has the authority to assure that navigable streams retain
their capacity to serve as highways of interstate commerce. When the
government has acquired fast lands 1 2 for the purpose of improving
navigation, it has not been required under the eminent domain clause
to compensate land owners for certain elements of damage attributable to riparian location.1 3 The Supreme Court has stated the concept thusly:
The primary use of the waters and the lands under them is for purposes of navigation, and the erection of the piers in them to improve
navigation for the public is entirely consistent with such use, and infringes no right of the riparian owner. Whatever the nature of the interest of a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front of his upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is not as full and
complete as his title to fast land which has no direct connection with
the navigation of such water.' 4
In other instances, however, the government has been required by
the eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment to condemn and
pay fair value for the acquisition of fast land.' I The nature of the
navigational servitude when invoked by the government in condemnation cases was well summarized as follows:
It is clear, of course, that a head of water has value and that the
Company has an economic interest in keeping the St. Croix at the
lower level. But not all economic interests are "property rights";
only those economic advantages are "rights" which have the law
back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts
compel others to forebear from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion.' 6
A long line of Supreme Court cases has delineated the elements of
compensable damages the government has been required to pay when
10. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
11. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) and United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
12. "Fast lands," as defined in the case, refer to firm land which has no direct connection with navigation of public navigable water.
13. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
14. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900).
15. See United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
16. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
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lands were riparian to navigable streams. The Court was often divided,
and results frequently turned on narrow distinctions. The Supreme
Court recently made the following observation:
[We have] been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining
when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by
than remain
public action be compensated by the government, rather
17
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the pond was navigable water of
the United States. However, the court of appeals reversed the district
court's holding that navigational servitude did not require petitioners
to grant public access to the pond. Thus, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the federal regulatory authority of navigational servitude could be separated consistently from the free right of
public use. More specifically, the issue was whether improvement to
Kuapa Pond so had altered its original character that it was no longer
a private marina but rather a public aquatic park.
After considering previous case law, the Supreme Court concluded
that prior decisions dealing with navigational servitude did not constitute a single body of law. More important than the rule of the law
was a close appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of navigability had been invoked. It determined that although the improved
pond fit within past definitions of navigability, the word itself had
been used for purposes other than delimiting the boundaries of navigational servitude.' I The Court then stated that the concept of navigational servitude itself did not create a blanket exception to the
takings clause. Although the pond might be subject to congressional
regulation under the commerce clause, it did not necessarily follow
that the pond was subject to public access without compensation to
its owners. Although the Court recognized the expansive authority of
Congress under the commerce clause empowered its assurance of a
free right of public access, it also determined such an action first required compensating the owners.
17. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), rehearing

denied 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
18. For example navigability has been used to (1) define the scope of Congress' regulatory authority under the commerce clause, see, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); (2) determine the extent of the authority of the Corps of
Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Act, see, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
362 U.S. 482 (1960); and (3) establish the limits of the jurisdiction of federal courts conferred by U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 over admiralty and maritime cases.
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It acknowledged that recent cases of riparian access seemed to limit
the government's liability to compensate." However, the facts in
Kaiser Aetna were so different from those in riparian condemnation
cases that the Court did not depend heavily on those past decisions.
Instead, it looked to the purpose of the doctrine of navigational servitude, which it found to be the regulation of navigable highways of
commerce.
In Kaiser Aetna, the Court determined the government's attempt
to create a public right of access to the improved pond went so far
beyond ordinary regulation for improvement of navigation, that it
did collide with a definite, protectible, economic advantage. The
Court found Kuapa Pond was not the sort of great navigable stream
incapable of private ownership. Rather, petitioners had an interest
strikingly similar to owners of fast land adjacent to navigable water.2
The Court further held the right to exclude, a fundamental property
right, 2 I fell within the category of interests the government could
not take without paying just compensation. The Court stated several
reasons for this conclusoin: prior to its improvement Kuapa Pond
was incapable of being used as a continuous highway for interstate
commerce; its maximum depth at high tide was only two feet; it was
separated from the adjacent bay and ocean by a natural barrier beach;
and its principal commercial value was fishing.
The Court had no doubt the government could have refused to
allow dredging on the ground that it would have interfered with navigation, or could have conditioned its approval of dredging on petitioner's compliance with various measures to promote navigation.
However, what existed was a body of water that was private property
under Hawaiian law and linked to navigable water by a channel which
had been dredged with the consent of the government. Although the
consent of individual officials representing the United States cannot
estop the United States, 2 2 it can lead to a number of expectations
rising to the level of a property interest which must be condemned
and compensated before the property can be taken.
DISSENTING OPINIONS
The essential problem facing the Court was twofold: does a body
of navigable water automatically come under the doctrine of federal
navigational servitude, and if so, does this doctrine constitute a blan19. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar, 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
20. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S., 164, 178 (1979).
21. See United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1961).
22. See Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961).
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ket exception to the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment? The
Court concluded that the improved pond was indeed a body of navigable waters, and therefore subject to navigational servitude. However, it also found that although the pond fell within the doctrine of
navigational servitude, the government could not take over management and control without first paying just compensation.
In this case the Court determined that the imposition of navigational servitude would result in actual physical invasion of a privately
owned marina, and that even if that invasion was only an easement in
the property, just compensation must be paid. 2" Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that if the government wished to make what was
formerly Kuapa Pond into a public aquatic park, it could not do so
without invoking its power of eminent domain and paying just compensation. Petitioners could not be required to allow free access to
the dredged pond when their previous customer agreement called for
an annual fee of $72.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissent centered on four areas. The first was
a belief that the Court incorrectly concluded there were no criteria
for identifying navigable waters. The dissent maintained that prior
cases had established three distinct tests for identifying navigable
waters: navigability in fact, navigable capacity, and ebb and flow of
the tide. He disagreed that previous case law abandoned the ebb and
flow test as being arbitrary and unsuitable when applied to conditions in the United States and maintained that the ebb and flow test
was valid when applied in a coastal setting since it defined the "geographical, chemical, and environmental limits of the [waters] that
wash our shores." 2 4 Since these bodies of water are themselves navigable, the dissent reasoned they should be navigable to the limits defined by the ebb and flow of the tide. Under this analysis the pond
was navigable water prior to development of the present marina since
it had already been subject to tidal action. In view of the importance
the Court attached to the private development which made the pond
navigable in fact, an alternative basis for navigability which found the
pond navigable before development was significant.
A second basis for dissent focused on the Court's decision that
federal navigational servitude did not extend to all navigable waters
of the United States. The dissent argued the term "navigational servitude" was coextensive with "navigable waters of the United States."
In its view the issue was not one of property, but rather of power.2 s
23. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
24. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183 (1979).
25. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956).
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The federal government's paramount control over waters used in
interstate commerce limited the power of the states' conflicting interests based on local property law. It was argued federal power did
not depend on the form of the body of water or the manner in which
it was created, but on the fact of its navigability.
Thirdly the dissent would reach a different result in balancing private interests against public access. It agreed with the majority that
prior decisions acknowledged the encroachment on rights in adjoining fast land or resulting from access to nonnavigable tributaries
might form a valid claim for compensation. 2 Hoewver, it distinguished these claims from the present one on the basis that these
compensable values had nothing to do with the use of navigable
water.
Since the chief value of the pond in its current state is its access to
navigable water, the dissent would find no valid compensation claim.
Development of the pond was undertaken to improve this value and
not to improve the pond as fast land.
Finally, the dissent would give a different weight to state property
law. It conceded merit to the majority assumption that Kuapa Pond
is the equivalent of fast land for purposes of Hawaiian property law.
Nevertheless, the opinion makes clear the belief that state-created interests in waters or beds of such waters are secondary to the navigational servitude. State law cannot control the scope of federal prerogatives.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion's abandonment of the old test for navigability
is commendable. The Supreme Court's appraisal of the situation
focused correctly on the reason the doctrine of navigational servitude
came into existence. It is preferable to justify the existence of any
rule by examining the reasons for its existence. However, at some
points the Court's reasoning seems obscure. Although the Court ultimately decided that the improved pond is navigable, it is somewhat
unclear about its route to this conclusion and its significance. It is
equally unclear about the actual significance of the large sums petitioners spent on the pond, although it does cite this as a factor in its
decision.
That a governmental official gave petitioners permission to proceed also seems to have been considered, even though the Court ad26. See United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961) and United
States v.Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
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mits that this does not give rise to estoppel. Finally, there seems to
be some confusion whether the outcome is limited to waters which
could not support navigation in their natural state.
In a companion case, Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp.,
the majority
agreed that there was no general right of public access to man-made
navigable canals in Louisiana bayou country. However, the case was
remanded for further hearings on whether developers had destroyed
a pre-existing navigable waterway, and, if so, what the legal ramifications should be.
This decision clearly is significant because of potential claims it
opens to land developers. Private improvements, which might once
have resulted in a waterway being classed navigable water of the
United States, can now transform it to private property. However, if
the Supreme Court follows the guidelines it set out in this opinion,
such a determination will be based on an ad hoc factual examination,
and indiscriminate private ownership of waterways still may be controlled.
MAUREEN MCGUINNESS

27. 444 U.S. 206 (1979).

